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Abstract 
This article argues that both flexible spectrum management and the concept of 
reconfigurability do not eliminate the need for certain centralized controlling 
entities, and even introduce a number of new entities performing regulatory, 
commercial and technical functions. One such entity, the Cognitive Pilot Channel 
(CPC), is presented, and different configurations of the CPC are outlined. 
Subsequently, the potential impact of different CPC configurations on business 
models for wireless services making use of such a channel is explored. The article 
concludes that a hybrid model combining a meta-level CPC with operator-
deployed channels might provide the best mix of technical and strategic control 
for operators, and value for users. 
 
Keywords:  business modeling, flexible spectrum management, controlling 
entities 
 
1 Introduction 
The concept of Flexible Spectrum Management (FSM) refers to a set of new and 
dynamic procedures and techniques for obtaining and transferring spectrum usage 
rights and dynamically changing the specific use of frequencies. Uncertainty 
currently exists concerning the way in which flexible spectrum management will 
be implemented. Without any doubt, different implementations will result in 
different business models for offering reconfigurable services, so it is crucial to 
all stakeholders to have an understanding about this relationship, and the potential 
business configurations it might result in. 
 
This paper seeks to provide an analytical framework for examining the influence 
of FSM on the business models deployed for “Beyond 3G”  (B3G) networks and 
services, in the context of operational solutions currently being developed within 
Phase II of the European FP6 project E
2
R.
i
 This project is concerned with 
reconfigurability of wireless networks and devices, which can be defined as the 
changeable behaviour of wireless networks and associated equipment, specifically 
in the fields of radio spectrum, radio access technologies, protocol stacks, and 
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application services, and usually in response to dynamic changes in their 
environment. In particular, this paper argues that, even within policy 
environments making increasingly more use of market based mechanisms, and 
even within reconfigurable systems where decision-making is highly 
decentralized and in which real-time mechanisms for dynamic spectrum 
management are used, there is a need for centralized controlling entities which 
may fulfill a diverse set of roles. Subsequently, it introduces the Cognitive Pilot 
Channel as such a controlling entity, and outlines a number of potential 
configurations for deployment of the CPC. Finally, it evaluates in an exploratory 
way the potential impact of these configurations on business models for CPC-
enabled mobile and wireless services. 
2 FSM and the need for controlling entities 
Diverse policy and regulatory evolutions are currently taking place in the 
direction of more flexible forms of spectrum management. These evolutions 
include the introduction of secondary trading of spectrum, as well as systems for 
more flexible change of use of frequencies, and policies aimed at allowing and 
regulating the use of opportunistic devices (i.e. devices intelligently taking 
advantage of available spectrum) making use of software defined radio 
technologies (i.e. radio systems which can be reprogrammed to tune to any 
frequency band and receive any modulation across a large frequency spectrum) . 
Steps to introduce these policies are being taken in a number of countries, and the 
European Commission is working on a harmonised, EU-wide approach, for 
example through its WAPECS policy. For an extensive overview of these 
evolutions on a national and on a European level, we refer to Delaere and Ballon 
(forthcoming). 
 
Although the final objective of FSM is a situation where market players define the 
best use for the spectrum they own, and where licenses change owners with little 
or no regulatory intervention, this does not mean that all activity in the spectrum 
domain becomes decentralised and bilaterally negotiated. On the contrary, we 
argue that FSM in a reconfigurable context leads to a new set of risks and 
challenges, some of which will need to be met by the use of existing and the 
introduction of new, centralised controlling mechanisms. As an illustration, 
Xavier and Ypsilanti (2006) discuss a number of concerns and costs which could 
hamper the introduction of secondary markets. A number of these are clearly 
related to a lack or bad functioning of centralised (i.e. transcending operator or 
user level) instruments. The most relevant of these issues are 1) the provision 
information to actors, 2) the mitigation of interference, 3) the coordination and 
harmonization of frequencies, 4) measures against anti-competitive behaviour and 
5) the pursuit of objectives of public interest and consumer protection (see also 
CEPT‟s ECC (2006) report). 
 
Concerning the need for information resources, diverse other studies confirm its 
importance: a BNetzA study emphasises the need for an electronically available 
central register of spectrum availability, license ownership and rights of use (WIK 
2006:131) while Ofcom (2007) has developed three different databases for this 
purpose. Pleas for centralized provision of information, related to middle-to-long-
term spectrum availability and usage rights or related to real-time spectrum 
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occupancy, can also be found in Weiss (2006), and in Chapin and Lehr 
(forthcoming), who argue that “The cost and risk of characterizing spectrum use 
can be reduced through establishing an information registry, which could be 
governmental or private, for authoritative data about primary uses”.  
 
Thus, the concept of Flexible Spectrum Management and reconfigurability, 
present risks and challenges which could necessitate the introduction of central 
controlling entities. Regulatory as well as business-related arguments exist for 
their introduction. From a regulatory point of view, controlling entities monitor 
compliance with policies and regulations, take action in case of violations, and 
may also support public policy objectives. From a business perspective, 
controlling mechanisms not only are enablers for more efficient spectrum 
management (potentially leading to lower costs and higher revenues), but the way 
in which they operate also helps to define the rules of the game for interacting 
with competitors, acquiring spectrum, getting access to users etc. The hypothesis 
following from this is that there are several „configurations‟ in which these 
controlling entities may be deployed, and the configuration chosen has an impact 
on the business models developed for the different wireless services that make use 
of them.  
 
As argued above, the primary function of central controlling entities is that of a 
registry.  In a more advanced form, these registries could become so-called pilot 
channels, which not only contain all information on available networks and 
occupied frequencies, but transmit this data to terminals in real-time so that these 
can be reconfigured to connect to whatever service available on whatever 
frequency. In this sense, these pilot channels can be seen as the first and foremost 
enablers of any FSM constellation. The next section introduces the Cognitive Pilot 
Channel (CPC) as an overarching, active registry entity, evaluates the possible 
configurations for CPC, and analyses its potential impact on the business models 
of mobile services that will rely on it. 
3 The Cognitive Pilot Channel as a Controlling Entity 
While contributing to spectrum efficiency, new scenarios for Dynamic Spectrum 
Access make the operation of systems making use of radio frequencies much 
more complex. One particular issue on the terminal side is that, when services are 
changing frequencies and vice versa, these terminals do not know what services 
are available, and where they are currently located, and would therefore constantly 
need to scan the entire spectrum in order to determine this. Clearly, this would be 
excessively power and time consuming. (Holland, Cordier et al 2006) Basically, 
the problem constitutes a particular instance of a lack of information, similar to 
the areas mentioned in the section above where this risk could compromise the 
take-up of mechanisms for flexible spectrum management. In the same way that 
insufficient data on spectrum licenses, leases, secondary use, trading activity etc. 
may lead to low spectrum trading activity, high transaction costs and increased 
interference, it may also effectively impede users to locate and connect to 
services.  
 
Equally similar to the need of central registries and supervising functions to solve 
the information deficit, the problems of frequency, technology and service 
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discovery could be solved by the establishment of another controlling entity. The 
E2R project has introduced a concept for this, i.e. the Cognitive Pilot Channel 
(CPC) (Holland, Muck et al, forthcoming; Perez-Romero et al, 2007). In its most 
basic form, this would be an invariable –and, thus, easily detectable– frequency 
through which the availability of services in certain geographic areas as well as 
the frequencies used by these services can be communicated to terminals in real-
time. This way, a terminal only needs to be “pre-programmed” to look for one 
frequency band of the radio spectrum (contrary for example to current 
GSM/UMTS cellular phones looking for services in the 800/900/1800/1900 Mhz 
band, besides WiFi hotspots at 2.4Ghz and so on), after which a data stream on 
this frequency informs the device on what services are available and what 
frequencies these services use; the device can then switch to a specific frequency 
to connect to a specific network. Besides this, the CPC could potentially also 
communicate other data such as pricing information and (potentially time-variant) 
usage policies, and could even be used to transmit missing protocols needed for 
example to be able to connect to a new Radio Access Technology (RAT) or 
enhance security. This way, a CPC would eliminate the need for continuous 
scanning of the entire spectrum (which would be very time- and battery-
consuming), while allowing services and RATs to be changed without limits. 
Moreover, if applied on a regional or global scale, a harmonized CPC frequency 
could greatly improve the cross-border functionality of devices: whatever services 
are deployed in a certain country or region, and whatever frequencies are locally 
used for these services, the CPC transmits the necessary data to the visiting 
terminal. 
 
Looking at the traditional value chain for wireless services, the CPC is located as 
a new segment in between the user/subscriber and the operator (including 2G/3G, 
WiFi access point, WiMAX operators etc., and possibly also broadcasters using 
Digital Terrestrial Television, DVB-H, 3G or other platforms) mediating 
information between these two roles. For the sake of clarity, the business roles of 
the operator (the offer of services to consumers with the associated functions) and 
the logistic management of the physical network are taken together in the term 
„operator‟ as it is used throughout this paper, even though these may be separated 
in real life (e.g. in the case of Mobile Virtual Network Operators or MVNOs). A 
role that may coincide with the CPC but can also be separate from it, is that of a 
spectrum broker, which –with either the subscriber of an operator as a customer– 
respectively provides retail and wholesale access to different Radio Access 
Technologies. Finally, the regulator may also play an important role in the 
ecosystem as it may incorporate the CPC role. Although other segments of the 
value chain are, of course, equally crucial in the eventual build-out of CPC-
enabled services -not in the least those of content provider/aggregator/store and of 
manufacturer (enabling devices to contact the CPC and to reconfigure 
themselves)- the following, exploratory business impact analysis of the CPC will 
mainly be centered about the relationships between these five roles: 
user/subscriber, CPC, spectrum broker, operator and regulator. 
 
The design of the most appropriate CPC is strongly dependent upon its business 
model implications. From a business model design perspective, the main question 
is how the design of CPC control (i.e. which actor will operate the CPC) will 
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impact on the value created for its users. Three CPC controlling entities may be 
imagined: 
 
 Every operator: when an exclusively in-band (i.e. making use of one 
channel withing one of the existing RATs of an operator, e.g. its GSM 
network) CPC entity is chosen, every operator deploys this entity and 
controls the parameters for the information to be transmitted as well as the 
usage policies. The operator will use one of his own networks to distribute 
this information; 
 Intermediary: in case of an out-band CPC (i.e. a dedicated frequency not 
linked to a specific RAT), the regulator could take up this centralized task 
as a complement to existing informational and monitoring missions (e.g. 
spectrum trading and secondary use registries). Transmission could 
happen via a network owned by the government (e.g. many terrestrial 
broadcasting networks), or via one or more privately operated networks 
(e.g. as a universal service provision). Alternatively, new actors could be 
added to the ecosystem which take up the role of providing an out-band 
CPC, and providing it as a service to operators. These could be entirely 
independent organizations, or a consortium of operators. 
 Hybrid architecture: as mentioned above, an out-band CPC operated by 
either the regulator or an intermediary (making use of one or more 
transmission networks) may be combined with an in-band CPC deployed 
by every operator; this implies a hierarchical system; 
 
The section below analyses how different implementations of the Cognitive Pilot 
Channel may impact the business models for mobile and wireless services that 
will operate under this controlling entity. 
4 Business Model Implications of the CPC 
Applying the basic business model design framework of Ballon (2007) to the 
concept of a CPC, we distinguish three basic business model issues from an 
operator and/or a user point of view. The three issues are: 
 
 Value network and customer control: this parameter firstly refers to the 
degree of control that an operator, in a certain scenario for CPC 
deployment, exerts onto the value network by combining essential 
resources, integrating roles within the production and distribution process, 
and controlling the different modules making up the design and 
deployment of their service as well as the intelligence stored in these 
module. Secondly, this factor defines to what extent the customer is tied to 
a specific operator as a result of a particular CPC configuration (e.g. 
through billing relationships and CRM), and the extent to which this 
customer is locked into an operator‟s domain, i.e. whether it is possible to 
make use of the services of different providers both from a technological 
(interoperability) as from a strategic (discoverability of competing 
services) viewpoint.  
 Cost and revenue structure: on the one hand, the basic question here is 
how the different costs associated with starting up a service (including the 
cost of the CPC) are divided over the different actors that make use of it, 
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including investment costs (capital expenditure and R&D) as well as 
operational expenses. On the other hand, this domain also aims to identify 
how the CPC influences the way in which revenue is generated for 
operators (direct/indirect, content/transport-based) and, more importantly, 
whether or not revenue sharing mechanisms between operators need to be 
established as a result of the introduction such a CPC entity.  
 User value: this refers to the influence of the CPC on how services being 
delivered through market positioning (i.e. as complements or as substitutes 
for other services), on the degree of customer involvement in the value 
creation of these services, and on the type of value that operators intend to 
reach through CPC-enabled services, i.e. operational excellence (cost-
based strategies), product leadership (quality-based strategies) or customer 
intimacy (lock-in). 
 
Although the limited length of this paper does not allow us to deeply present the 
theoretical foundation of the different concepts mentioned above (again we refer 
to Ballon 2007 for this), it is clear that an extensive body of academic literature 
exists exploring and analyzing these concepts. Some key works on these topics, 
on the basis of which the above classification was made, are Hawkins (2001), 
Faber et al (2003), Bouwman & MacInnes (2006), Haaker et al (2004), 
Osterwalder (2004), Wehn de Montalvo et al (2005), Robertson & Langlois 
(1994), Lee (2006), Shapiro & Varian (1999), Treacy & Wiersema (1993), 
Bouwman (2003) and Porter (1979, 1985). 
 
Analysing these three questions, we can now determine CPC impacts for the three 
deployment scenarios, i.e. the operator, intermediary and hybrid system. These 
three scenarios represent a specific and logical configuration of technological, 
architectural, strategic and regulatory choices (such as in-band/out-band, one or 
multiple layers, ownership of layers and degree of harmonisation). 
4.1 Operator-based system 
In this first scenario, all operators have their own in-band CPC which 
communicates directly with user devices. For example, an operator O1 deploys a 
2G and a 3G cellular network over a given territory, as well as Wireless Local 
Area Network (WLAN) hotspots in selected urban meshes. The operator‟s SIM 
card contains the frequency information for the CPC of O1, to which the device 
always connects at start-up. Then, depending on RAT availability and the service 
requested, one of the three networks is automatically chosen, after which the 
device switches to the communicated frequency and connects to this network. 
Seamless handover could be provided so that, again for example, a 2G voice call 
could be switched to WLAN Voice-Over-IP (VoIP) whenever the terminal comes 
within the range of a WiFi hotspot. Such handovers could also be initiated by the 
operators when certain networks become congested. At the same time, operator 
O2 deploys a combination of WiFi and WiMAX access points, and has its own 
CPC to direct its subscribers to the frequencies used. 
 
In this scenario, value network control as well as customer control will inherently 
be significantly higher than in other configurations, and comparable with the 
existing situation for 2G/3G services, in which SIM-cards or packages with 
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locked terminals ensure a fixed relationship between customers and operators. 
Large parts of the value network are controlled by one party, which also possesses 
the technical and customer-related intelligence residing within these roles. This 
intelligence could include data on spectrum availability for the array of RATs 
offered by a specific operator, terminal usage profiles, billing history, location 
data etc. Users might switch between the networks available but continuously 
remain within the domain of one operator; in this sense, the CPC‟s function is not 
extended to that of a marketplace or broker, but rather forms an integrated 
component of the operator‟s infrastructure which enables A) increasing spectrum 
efficiency for that one operator, thus reducing Capital and Operational 
Expenditure (CAPEX/OPEX), and/or B) value to the user by allowing the 
discovery of multiple RATs which may then be used either as part of an “always 
best connected” subscription service or on an ad hoc basis. This added value 
offered to the user is complementary: the different networks on offer are not 
owned by different operators and therefore do not compete with the objective of 
substituting each other, but are selected in view of the requirements posed by a 
specific service, or of efficiency considerations by the operator. The fact that the 
CPC resides within the domain of the operator also results in easy transmission of 
data to the entity (since it is controlled and trusted), eliminates negotiations and 
conflicts between operators and potential intermediaries, and might also make the 
technical infrastructure easier to maintain. 
 
In terms of cost and revenue, this scenario is highly concentrated. Being the sole 
owner and user of a CPC, the operator will need to have the necessary usage 
rights for CPC spectrum as well as have access a transmission network with wide 
area coverage. Moreover, it needs to be noted that, if all operators have their own 
CPC, investment and operational costs, as well as the costs associated with 
harmonization, are to be multiplied by the number of CPCs to be deployed. This 
might render these costs prohibitive, in particular for smaller operators that do not 
have a large customer base and/or national coverage, such as WLAN hotspot 
operators, and therefore result in CPC-enabled dynamic spectrum access only 
being used by existing large-scale operators that in many cases already offer a mix 
of licensed and unlicensed RATs to their customers. On the other hand, revenues 
are also concentrated within one actor, since the CPC is an integrated part of the 
operator, so that no intermediary needs to be compensated. 
 
It is clear that such a CPC deployment would be part of an operator‟s strategy 
aimed at intimacy with the consumer: it will give the demanding user no 
opportunity to subscribe to competitors, but instead offer him increased 
connectivity, with an in-house RAT available for the different types of service 
requirements the user might have.  
4.2 Intermediary-based system 
In the second scenario, an intermediary party deploys an out-band CPC. Two 
variants are possible: in a first one, the government takes up the role of 
administering a single CPC covering the entire territory, while in a second variant, 
several out-band CPCs are launched as commercial services by new actors. 
Subsequently, operators may have their networks with the respective frequencies 
listed on the CPC of one or more intermediaries, in order to reach as many 
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potential customers as possible. In the case of private intermediaries, different 
marketing strategies could thereby be imagined, for example the use of premium 
fees for top listings or the grouping of different RATs by one operator under one 
heading. This is also reflected in the different strategies that an intermediary can 
adopt towards the user: besides just offering a real-time list of available networks, 
premium packages may also be proposed, in which the broker actively looks for, 
suggests and (for example with the help of a software agent installed onto the 
terminal) even reconfigures the device to use the network that best meets certain 
pre-set requirements such as price, bandwidth, QoS etc.  
 
In this scenario, the CPC would contain essential information on different RATs 
available from different operators in a specific mesh. Since it is not a hierarchical 
system, the user‟s device would switch directly from the meta-CPC to a specific 
service on a particular frequency. With only one level and limited capacity on the 
CPC, this implies that choices will need to be made with regard to the granularity 
of the system: on the one hand, an efficient channel aimed at maximizing 
competition between operators and technologies would contain not only the 
different licensed and unlicensed RATs deployed by major network business 
owners, but also local hotspots for (mostly unlicensed) technologies operated by 
small, independent providers. However, this may crowd the CPC with information 
on relatively small networks with a mixed degree of capacity, accessibility and 
reliability, so clearly a trade-off will need to be made here. 
 
Contrary to the operator-based system, value network control as well as customer 
control are low when regulators or private intermediaries administer the CPC. 
Firstly, the CPC is not vertically integrated but resides outside the domain of the 
operators, acting as an intermediary role between customers and operators. Since 
the operators do not own the CPC, they are bound to transmit only that 
information which the intermediary requires from them, and have to offer this 
information on the CPC together with data from other operators. This makes it 
difficult for operators to lock in subscribers to their services. A way for operators 
to solve this, would be to programme the device such that it filters out from the 
CPC only those networks offered by a certain operator, thereby significantly 
increasing customer control. However, this implies that an a priori customer 
relationship exists between operator and consumer, that the operator is still able to 
lock terminals in the same way that it does today, and that the consumer is willing 
to accept that any RAT available on the meta-CPC but not belonging to its 
operator is unavailable, even though his device would support the technology. 
 
By not being part of the operator‟s infrastructure, the CPC is also not a source of 
customer intelligence for the operators, but on the contrary acts as a data flow 
barrier between subscribers and business owners. For the user, the CPC –if 
unfiltered– acts as a neutral regulated marketplace of services; however, as any 
other market the CPC will function imperfectly if consumers do not have the 
information needed to make a rational choice –implying that data is not only 
needed on RATs and services but also on their functionality, reliability and price– 
and/or if barriers to market entry (i.e. CPC access) are too high. This again refers 
to the degree of granularity wanted, and the measures to obtain it. Also, a 
fragmentation of intelligence might create an information deficit for users, 
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comparable to searching any other service that is available via different brokers. 
Finally, CPC data will need to be gathered from different operators, transmitted in 
real-time to one or more CPC entities, transformed into a single CPC data stream 
and then again transmitted over a separate CPC network. Given the sensitivity of 
the data, this fragmentation of intelligence –and responsibility– is likely to 
increase conflicts.  
 
As far as cost is concerned, it is the intermediary which needs to procure the 
necessary funds for the establishment of the CPC as well as provide a budget for 
its operational expenses; in case the regulator acts as the only intermediary, no 
spectrum rights need to be purchased and maintained for different operators, and 
no license needs to be obtained and financially maintained for the out-band CPC. 
In terms of revenue sharing, the case is different for the two variants. If the 
intermediary is the government, it will not need to be compensated for the 
advantages provided by a CPC. However, if one or more private identities cover 
costs associated with running the service (second variant), these intermediaries 
will need to earn back these costs by taking a share of the revenues realized by its 
customers. These customers might be end users, who pass part of their savings on 
operator and service fees onto the broker. Alternatively or concurrently customers 
might be operators, who pay simply to be listed onto the intermediary‟s CPC 
platform and/or to occupy premium spots on that platform. In both variants, 
however, this scenario makes the CPC more interesting to smaller operators than a 
decentralized system, and are likely to spur competition between a large number 
of operators with diverging networks and services. 
 
Another clear difference from the operator-based model lies in the nature of the 
value that is proposed to users. Having to compete with various other operators on 
the CPC with often duplicate technologies and services, the value will be defined 
in terms of how they could substitute rather than complement competing RATs 
and services. For example, a user can consult the CPC for available WLAN 
networks and select the operator which best suits his requirements (cost-per-
second, cost-per-bit, signal strength, speed, or a combination of these). As a result, 
operator strategies cannot solely be based upon increasing intimacy. Instead, they 
will more likely be positioned as being cost-effective or quality-ensuring.  
4.3 Hybrid system 
As mentioned, a fourth and final possible configuration of the CPC could be a 
hybrid system, consisting of one out-band meta-CPC combined with different, 
operator-level in-band channels. In this hierarchical scenario the out-band CPC, 
operated by either the government or by an intermediary private party, 
communicates to devices only the location in the spectrum of the operators‟ in-
band pilot channels. After having scanned the meta-CPC for the locations of the 
different operators, the user selects a specific operator, whose in-band CPC is then 
consulted for the networks on offer, or the device autonomously receives network 
and frequency information from multiple in-band CPCs to increase the choice of 
networks. One of the main advantages of this configuration is that, while giving 
operators full control over their own pilot channel, only one CPC channel needs to 
be harmonized and known a priori by the device; all the other frequencies, 
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including that of the different in-band CPCs and of the networks that they list, 
may change dynamically as allocations and assignments are altered. 
 
Because of the hybrid architecture, value network control and customer ownership 
are on an intermediate level. By keeping part of the CPC entity within its own 
domain, the operator has the flexibility to communicate any information desired to 
the customer and, from the moment that its CPC has been selected, has a direct 
relationship with this customer. However, the upper hierarchical level resides 
outside of the operator‟s domain and may function as an open marketplace. As in 
the regulator-based system, operators could still lock in users by reaching 
contractual agreements which allow them to have the terminals filter out only 
their CPC from the meta-channel; however, it remains to be seen to what degree 
customers as well as terminal manufacturers will allow such control. In any case, 
modularity and distribution of intelligence are higher, making the system as a 
whole more complex to handle than a single-CPC model, while giving more 
control to the operators than in the regulator or intermediary-based models to 
manage their own channel. 
 
A similar evaluation can be made for cost and revenue models. Both will be 
mixed, as investments and operational expenses will need to be made on two CPC 
levels, of which one will reside within and the other outside of the operator‟s 
responsibility. Therefore, as in the operator-based model, operators will have to 
bear the cost of setting up and maintaining a CPC, which plays to the advantage of 
larger actors with have more financial resources and more RATs to advertise via a 
single in-band channel. An advantage over the operator-based model, however, is 
that these in-band CPCs do not need to be harmonized and may be located on 
whatever suitable frequency band that is available, probably rendering these 
frequencies more affordable for smaller operators. As for revenues, these may be 
entirely transferred to the operators, or may have to be shared with an 
intermediary if this actor is responsible for setting up the meta-CPC. Therefore, 
both the operator-based and intermediary-based financial analysis with regard to 
revenue models may be valid, depending on the type of hybrid model selected.  
 
A variety of possible strategies can also be noted with regard to the proposed 
value. For example, an operator could use SIM locking to lead customers to their 
in-band CPC (intimacy strategy), and subsequently promote different RATs as 
complements to each other: GSM for QoS-guaranteed voice and SMS 
applications, WLAN for low coverage, high bit-rate data transmission and 
seamless handover to UMTS in case the connection with the WLAN network is 
lost. Alternatively, users could purchase a device without any a priori subscription 
to an operator, and use a combination of out-band CPC and several in-band CPCs 
to discover substituting services within (e.g. competing WLAN networks) or 
across technologies (e.g. GSM voice services versus VoIP over WLAN) based on 
quality and/or price considerations. If the meta-CPC is deployed by an 
intermediary, users could subscribe to an active brokerage service by this 
intermediary, in order to always be redirected, via one of the operator‟s CPCs, to 
the cheapest or best network available for the desired service; operators could in 
their turn make agreements with intermediaries to get top-of-list advertisements.  
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5 Conclusions 
In this article, a short overview has been given of policy trends towards more 
flexible forms of spectrum management. We have argued that both flexible 
spectrum management and the concept of reconfigurability, although distributing 
decision-making and intelligence on spectrum allocation and assignment, do not 
eliminate the need for certain centralized controlling entities, and even introduce a 
number of new ones. One such entity, the Cognitive Pilot Channel, has been 
presented here, and three different configurations of the CPC have been outlined. 
Subsequently, we have explored the potential impact of different CPC 
configurations on business models for wireless services making use of such a 
Cognitive Pilot Channel. The three domains of analysis and the respective values 
for the different CPC configurations can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Overview of CPC domains of analysis 
 
This analysis has shown that, while giving large scale, multi-RAT operators 
significant advantages in terms of value chain and customer control, product 
positioning and revenue concentration, the operator-based scenario does not seem 
to optimize value for customers and create a maximal degree of competition 
between actors and technologies. Such degree of competition (inter-broker, inter-
operator, and inter-technology) and of user value types is clearly present in the 
intermediary-based model, however operators might have too little control over 
the architecture and of their customers, and the practical complexity of the system 
might be too high for them to support this configuration. Also, harmonization of 
the necessary frequencies might be problematic in both the operator and the 
private intermediary configurations. For these reasons, a hybrid model might 
perhaps be the best choice, because it limits harmonization issues and allows a 
competitive market of CPC-enabled services to develop, while also giving 
operators sufficient technical and strategic control. However, as the evaluation 
made in this study is exploratory in nature (since, for example, no exact 
estimations of cost and revenue, or harmonization feasibility and roadmaps can be 
made at this time), further research in all three domains of analysis as well as 
policy and regulatory analysis will need to be undertaken. 
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 domain of analysis domain aspects  operator  intermediary hybrid 
1. control value network control high low medium 
  customer control high low medium 
2. cost and revenue structure cost distribution centralised centralised both 
  revenue distribution concentrated both both 
3. user value product positioning complement substitute both 
  intended value type intimacy mix mix 
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